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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND DESCRIPTION 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This respondent adopts the statement contained in the 
appellant's brief with respect to jurisdiction and a description 
of the proceedings below. Unless otherwise noted, Martin Stern, 
Jr. AIA Architect and Associates shall be referred to as "Martin 
Stern" or "respondent". The term appellant shall be used to 
refer to plaintiff/appellant James Sanchez. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This respondent does not contest the statement of issues 
presented for review described by appellant in his brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES 
AND RULES 
In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions 
identified by appellant in his brief, the following provisions 
are relevant respecting Issue No. 4 presented in appellant' s 
brief: 
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-35. EFFECT OF ABSENCE FROM STATE. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a 
person when he is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term that 
is limited by this chapter after his return 
to the state. If after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, the time 
of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . 
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes. . . . 
1 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2305. 15 (Supp, 1987): 
When a cause of action accrues against a 
person, if he is out of the state, has 
absconded, or conceals himself, the period of 
limitation for the commencement of the action 
as provided in Sections 2305. 04 to 2305. 14, 
1302. 98, and 1304. 29 of the Revised Code, 
does not begin to run until he comes into the 
state or while he is so absconded or 
concealed. After the cause of action accrues 
if he departs from the state, absconds, or 
conceals himself, the time of his absence or 
concealment shall not be computed as any part 
of a period within which the action must be 
brought. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent generally accepts the Statement of Facts Relevant 
to the Issues Presented for Review as set forth in appellant' s 
brief as supplemented herein: 
1. Defendant Martin Stern, Jr. AIA Architect & Associates 
is a professional corporation incorporated under the laws of the 
State of California with its principal place of business in the 
State of California. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-25. 5 is constitutional and was 
properly applied by the district court to dismiss plaintiff' s 
claims on summary judgment. Martin Stern, Jr. AIA Architect & 
Associates (hereafter "Martin Stern"), in the interest of 
brevity, adopts the arguments made and authorities cited in the 
superior brief of co-defendant Okland Construction Company, 
including the arguments predicated upon the doctrine of stare 
decisis, the open courts analysis and the equal protection 
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analysis advanced therein. 
Martin Stern joins with Okland Construction with respect to 
Point II of Okland' s brief regarding the summary judgment 
granted to Okland against Little America Hotel on the claims for 
indemnification. Martin Stern did not joint Okland in its motion 
against the claims raised against Martin Stern on the same 
theories because Martin Stern elected to first clarify through 
additional discovery that there is no basis for a claim for 
contractual indemnification against Martin Stern by Little 
America. As Martin Stern will advance the same argument made by 
Okland Construction in due course, it joins with Okland in the 
arguments advanced in Okland' s brief. 
There was no basis to deny Martin Stern7 s motion for summary 
judgment against plaintiff under the provisions of §78-12-35, a 
provision which purports to toll applicable statutes of 
limitation against persons when they are out of the state. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has recently ruled that 
provisions such as §78-12-35 present an unconstitutional and 
unwarranted restriction upon interstate commence when applied to 
a corporate defendant such as Martin Stern under these 
circumstances. The summary judgment of the trial court must 
therefore be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MARTIN STERN IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RAISING 
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE AT 78-12-25. 5 FOR 
HAVING FAILED TO PLEAD SAME. 
In the district court and in his docketing statement filed 
with this court, plaintiff asserted that defendant Martin Stern 
failed to plead the statute of repose at 78-12-25.5 U. C. A. , as 
amended, in its answer, and could therefore not predicate a 
motion for summary judgment upon the same. After discussions 
between counsel, plaintiff has dropped this issue from his brief, 
recognizing that Martin Stern did in fact plead the statute of 
repose in its answer to plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint 
dated April 15, 1988. Therein, in the second defense, Martin 
Stern alleged: 
Second Defense 
Plaintiff' s claims against this defendant are 
barred by virtue of the provisions of §78-12-
25.5 U. C. A. , 1953 as amended, for the reason 
that more than seven (7) years have elapsed 
after the completion of construction of the 
swimming pool and sauna and/or other 
improvements to real property which form the 
basis for plaintiff7 s claims. 
Martin Stern's understanding is that plaintiff has dropped 
this aspect of his appeal after recognizing that the statute of 
repose actually was pled in the only response ever filed by 
Martin Stern to any claim of plaintiff against it. Martin Stern 
intends that there be no confusion or misunderstanding in this 
appeal that it did plead the statute of repose as an affirmative 
defense to plaintiff' s complaint. 
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POINT II. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 578-12-25.5 IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROPERLY SUPPORTS THE 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO MARTIN STERN. 
As has been noted in the brief of Okland, statutes are 
endowed with a strong presumption of validity. They should not 
be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis 
upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional 
framework. Murray Citv v. Hall, 663 P. 2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court, in evaluating a 
challenge similar to that raised by plaintiff here against the 
Colorado statute of repose for architects and contractors stated 
that "[w]e note that the statute is presumed to be constitutional 
and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving unconstitutionality 
beyond a reasonable doubt. " (citations omitted. ) Yarbro v. 
Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P. 2d 822, 824-825 (Supreme Court of 
Colorado, En Banc, 1982) (reh. den. 1983. ) 
In the interest of brevity and to avoid unnecessary 
repetition, Martin Stern hereby incorporates the arguments 
advanced in the superior brief filed by Donald J. Purser and 
Dwight C. Packard of and for Purser, Okazaki & Berrett, counsel 
for defendant/respondent Okland Construction Company. Martin 
Stern borrows from the brief of co-respondent Okland with the 
permission of its counsel and specifically incorporates all of 
Point I of Okland' s brief hereat by reference. This 
incorporation is intended to incorporate Okland' s arguments 
respecting the doctrine of stare decisis, its argument respecting 
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the open courts provisions of the Constitution of Utah and its 
arguments respecting the equal protection provisions of the 
Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United States. 
In further support of those arguments, Martin Stern notes 
that this court was presented with a further opportunity to 
address the constitutionality of the statute of repose at §78-12-
25. 5 U. C. A. upon arguments predicated upon Berry v Beech 
Aircraft Corp. , 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) in the case Jackson v. 
Lavton City. 743 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1987). While it appears that 
the argument may have been raised for the first time on oral 
argument, this court' s opinion does not indicate that the court 
declined to consider the arguments advanced on that basis. 
In Jackson, plaintiffs asserted that the seven (7) year 
statute of repose extended their time for bringing suit against 
an owner m possession which had also planned and constructed the 
improvements claimed to have caused plaintiffs' personal 
injuries. The court noted that the Jacksons had an effective 
remedy against Layton City as owner in possession of the property 
that could have been filed within four years from the date of 
plaintiffs' injuries. Thus the plaintiffs were unable to invoke 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , s upra, to attack the 
constitutionality of 78-12-25. 5. This court affirmed the trial 
court ruling under 78-12-25. 5 that dismissed Jacksons' actions 
against Layton City as the improver of the property because, from 
the record, it appeared that the subject improvements had been 
completed for over seven (7) years before the Jacksons filed 
6 
their Complaint. 
The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Yarbro v. 
Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P. 2d 822, supra, fully addressed 
arguments attacking the constitutionality of a similar Colorado 
statute of repose respecting architects and contractors. The 
Colorado statute, as here, was challenged on both due process and 
equal protection grounds. 
In addressing the due process arguments, the Colorado court 
observed that limitations of liability for architects and others 
similarly situated by reasonable means do serve a legitimate 
public purpose. 655 P. 2d 825. Citing Rosenberg v. Town of North 
Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A. 2d 662 (1972). The court noted: 
There comes a time when [the defendant] ought 
to be secure in his reasonable expectation 
that the slate has been wiped clean of 
ancient obligations, and he ought not to be 
called to resist a claim when "evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded and witnesses 
have disappeared." 61 N.J. at 201, 293 A. 2d 
at 667-668 (1972) quoting Developments in the 
Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 
1177, 1185 (1950). 
655 P. 2d 825. The court further noted, quoting Mishek v. 
Stanton. 616 P. 2d 135, 138 (Colo. 1980): 
The general rule is that a statute of 
limitations . . . does not violate due 
process "unless the time fixed by the statute 
is manifestly so limited as to amount to a 
denial of justice . . . . The legislature is 
the primary judge of whether the time allowed 
is reasonable. " Qberst v. Mays, 148 
Colo. 285, 292, 365 P. 2d 902, 905 (citations 
omitted) 
655 P. 2d 825. The Colorado court noted that since construction 
projects generally have expected useful lives of many decades, 
possibilities for long term liability for builders and architects 
are enormous. The court affirmed the policy adopted by the 
General Assembly of Colorado to limit the extended exposure to 
liability of these persons by barring suits against architects 
brought without the period of repose specified in the statute. 
Because the Colorado statute was rationally related to a 
permissible state objective, it did not violate due process. 
Similarly, the Utah statute of repose at 78-12-25.5 is 
rationally related to and furthers the same permissible state 
objective and does not violate due process of the law. 
The Yarbro court similarly dismissed the related "open 
courts" argument raised by the plaintiff in that action, noting 
that as the statute applied to nonvested rights to sue an 
architect or contractor and to vested rights which were not 
timely prosecuted, the statute did not violate the open courts 
provision of the Colorado Constitution. That provision is 
similar in effect to Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of 
Utah. The Yarbro court held .that since the time for filing suit 
against the architect in that case had lapsed pursuant to the 
statute prior to the time of the plaintiff' s/decedent' s injuries, 
the cause of action against the architect never arose or vested. 
655 P. 2d 827. The court thus rejected the argument attacking the 
referenced statute of repose predicated upon the Colorado open 
courts provision. This court should reject plaintiff's 
arguments on the same basis because, as noted in the brief of 
Okland, plaintiff has not been denied a remedy against the owner 
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of the property. 
The Yarbro court also addressed an attack on the statute of 
repose on equal protection grounds. As here, plaintiff Yarbro 
argued that the statute granted immunity to a certain 
classification of defendants without a rational basis. The 
Yarbro court noted that since no fundamental right or class such 
as race, sex or national origin was involved, scrutiny of the 
statute was based upon the inquiry as to whether the statutory 
classification was reasonably related to a legitimate state 
objective. 655 P. 2d 827 citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 
17, 99 S. Ct. 887, 898, 59 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1979); New Orleans v. 
Duke, 427 U. S. 297, 303-304, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2516-2517, 49 L. Ed. 2d 
511 (1976); Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc. , 514 F. Supp. 1212, 
1217 (D.Colo. 1981). 655 P. 2d 827. 
The Yarbro court, as previously observed by Okland in its 
brief, noted the rational basis for a distinction between 
architects and contractors on one hand and materialmen and owners 
on the other. Beyond the reasons discussed in the Yarbro case, 
the following other factors should be considered which justify 
the rationality of the distinction: 
1. Builders and architects are subjected to a broad scope 
of liability which requires limitation. As noted by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong 
Cork Co. , 382 A. 2d 715 (Pa. 1976): 
The scope of liability of the class of 
builders differs significantly from that of 
the class of owners. First, the class of 
persons to whom builders may be liable is 
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larger than the class to which owners may be 
liable. Landowners may be liable to others 
who come onto their land. Builders, however, 
may be liable both to the landowners and to 
others who use the land. Second, a builder 
may be liable for construction defects under 
various legal theories -- contract, warranty, 
negligence, and perhaps strict liability in 
tort. Landowner liability for such defects, 
on the other hand, typically lies only in 
tort, unless the land owner is a lessor, in 
which case he is liable only for events 
occurring while the tenant is in possession. 
382 A. 2d 718. See also Barnhous v. Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 
(Cal.App. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson 
Construction Co. , 489 A. 2d 413 (Del. 1984); Beecher v. White. 417 
N. E. 2d 662 (Ind. App. 1983). 
2. It is rational to limit the liability of builders and 
architects since they have no control over the building after 
relinquishing it to the owner. After the owner of a structure 
accepts the finished product, the architect has no right to 
control the number and type of persons entering the building or 
to regulate the condition of entry. Following acceptance of the 
completed structure, there is a possibility of neglect, abuse, 
poor maintenance, improper modification and unskilled repair. 
The architect and builder have no opportunity to make ongoing 
inspections or to control these factors. These distinctions have 
been recognized and accepted by a number of courts in sustaining 
the constitutionality of their respective state architects' 
statutes of repose. See Barnhous v. Pinole, supra; Yarbro v. 
Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P. 2d 822, supra and Cheswold Volunteer 
Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co. , gupra. 
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3. Statistically a seven (7) year period in which to bring 
an action against an architect will encompass almost ail claims 
that will arise. As noted in Okland' s brief, Congressional 
studies have indicated that the overwhelming majority of claims 
brought against architects are brought within seven (7) years of 
completion of construction. This is true because most defects in 
the design or construction of improvements to real property 
manifest within seven (7) years. See Hearing on H. R. 6527. H. R. 
6678 and H. R. 11544 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House 
Committee on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Session 28 
(1967). 
4. Buildings may last for literally hundreds of years and 
a limitation is needed to eliminate perpetual liability on the 
part of architects. This is especially apparent given problems 
of proof in defending stale claims. As noted in Okland' s brief, 
there are already problems of proof presented in this case with 
respect to the routine destruction of city building inspection 
records and the death of the inspector who inspected these 
premises on behalf of Salt Lake City Corporation. Brief of 
Okland, page 15: Transcript of Hearing on Motions for Summary 
Judgment, page 6; Record at 513. 
5. The statute under consideration promotes innovation and 
experimentation to the end of improving design and construction 
of improvements to real property. As noted in 0' Brien v. Hazelet 
& Erdal, 299 N. W. 2d 336, 342 (Mich. 1980): 
Innovations are usually accompanied by some 
unavoidable risk. Design creativity might be 
11 
stifled if architects and engineers labored 
under the fear that every untried 
configuration might have unsuspected flaws 
that could lead to liability decades later. 
Cited in Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels, 655 P. 2d 822, 828. 
There is no question that the statute enacted by the Utah 
Legislature to secure repose from actions against architects and 
contractors after improvements to real property have been 
completed for more than seven years is rationally related to 
accomplish legitimate legislative objectives. The statute thus 
passes muster under the equal protection clauses of both state 
and federal constitutions. For these reasons and based upon the 
reasons and arguments cited in the brief of Okland, the appeal of 
Sanchez with respect to the constitutionality of 78-12-25.5 must 
be denied and the order of the district court granting summary 
judgment to Martin Stern must be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE PROVISIONS OF U. C. A. 78-12-35 (THE 
TOLLING STATUTE) MAY NOT OPERATE TO DENY 
MARTIN STERN SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff argues that the district court's summary judgment 
order in favor of Martin Stern was inappropriate and/or premature 
because it has not been established in the record whether Martin 
Stern, a California corporation, ceased doing business in Utah 
after it completed its work on the Little America project. 
Plaintiff relies upon the tolling statute found at 78-12-35. 
Plaintiff7 s argument fails and Martin Stern was properly 
entitled to summary judgment because, as applied to Martin Stern, 
the tolling provisions of 78-12-35 are unconstitutional as an 
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impermissible restriction upon interstate commerce under the rule 
of Bendix Autolite Corp, v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 
U.S. ; 108 S. Ct. 2218; 100 L. Ed. 2d 896, 56 U. S. L. W. 4648, 
Westlaw: 1988 W. L. 59900 (U.S.) (decided June 17, 1988). 
In Bendix Autolite, Bendix sued an Illinois corporation not 
qualified to do business in Ohio for breach of contract in 
relation to a boiler which had been installed by Midwesco in 
Ohio. Bendix brought suit in federal district court in Ohio 
against Midwesco. Midwesco asserted the Ohio statute of 
limitations as a defense. Bendix argued that the limitation did 
not run because Midwesco was an Illinois corporation not 
qualified in Ohio and therefore the running of the statute of 
limitations was tolled pursuant to a provision in the Ohio 
Revised Code similar to the provisions of §78-12-35 U. C. A. , 
1953. X 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that states may 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2305. 15 (Supp. 1987) provides as 
follows: 
When a cause of action accrues against a 
person, if he is out of the state, has 
absconded, or conceals himself, the period of 
limitation for the commencement of the action 
as provided in Sections 2305. 04 to 2305. 14, 
1302. 98, and 1304. 29 of the Revised Code, 
does not begin to run until he comes into the 
state or while he is so absconded or 
concealed. After the cause of action accrues 
if he departs from the state, absconds, or 
conceals himself, the time of his absence or 
concealment shall not be computed as any part 
of a period within which the action must be 
brought. 
13 
not withdraw defenses predicated upon statutes of limitations on 
conditions repugnant to the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution of the United States. In holding that the 
Ohio statute was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted that 
the burden that the tolling statute placed upon interstate 
commerce was significant. It stated: 
The Ohio statutory scheme thus forces a 
foreign corporation to choose between 
exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio 
courts (by appointing a resident agent for 
service of process and qualifying to do 
business in Ohio) or forfeiture of the 
limitations defense, remaining subject to 
suit in Ohio in perpetuity. Requiring a 
foreign corporation to appoint an agent for 
service in all cases and to defend itself 
with reference to all transactions, including 
those in which it did not have the minimum 
contacts necessary for supporting personal 
jurisdiction, is a significant burden, 
(citation omitted.) 56 L. W. 4650, 108 S. Ct. 
2221 
The court further noted: 
In the particular case before us, the Ohio 
tolling statute must fall under the Commerce 
Clause. Ohio cannot justify its statute as a 
means of protecting its residents from 
corporations who become liable for acts done 
in the State but later withdraw from the 
jurisdiction, for it is conceded by all 
parties that the Ohio long arm statute would 
have permitted service on Midwesco throughout 
the period of limitations. The Ohio statute 
of limitations is tolled only for those 
foreign corporations that do not subject 
themselves to the general jurisdiction of 
Ohio courts. In this manner the Ohio statute 
imposes a greater burden upon out-of-state 
companies than it does upon Ohio companies, 
subjecting the activities of foreign and 
domestic corporations to inconsistent 
regulations. (citation omitted. ) 56 LW 
4650, 108 S.Ct. 2222 
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Like the Ohio statute, the provisions of §78-12-35 U C A 
require that a foreign corporation choose between (1) 
registering and qualifying to do business m Utah and thereby 
subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of Utah courts for all 
purposes, or (2) remaining subject to suit in Utah in perpetuity 
for acts committed in Utah for which long arm jurisdiction is 
available. Thus, like the Ohio statute, the Utah statute 
discriminates between foreign and domestic corporations and 
imposes an unnecessary and unconstitutional burden upon 
interstate commerce For that reason, the provisions of §78-12-
35 are unconstitutional as applied to Martin Stern in these 
circumstances. 
Defendant' s Motion for summary Judgment should not have been 
denied on the basis of §78-12-35 even if Martin Stern was absent 
from the state of Utah from the very day it completed its work on 
the Little America Hotel to the present No material factual 
question is presented as to whether or not Martin Stern, a 
California corporation, was absent from this state after 
completion of the Little America Hotel. The appeal of 
plaintiff /appellant on this issue must be denied and the order 
granting Martin Stern's summary judgment by the trial court 
affirmed 
POINT IV 
MARTIN STERN JOINS IN THE ARGUMENTS OF OKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO THE 
INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS OF LITTLE AMERICA 
HOTEL CORPORATION 
Little America Hotel Corporation has raised similar claims 
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for indemnification against Martin Stern as those under review in 
the appeal by Little America of the trial court' s order granting 
Okland Construction summary judgment. Martin Stern did not file 
its own motion for summary judgment against Little America on the 
indemnification claims in the interest of conducting further 
discovery to establish that there was no basis for a claim of 
contractual indemnification by Little America against Martin 
Stern. 
It is likely, at the appropriate time after completion of 
discovery relevant to this issue, that Martin Stern will file a 
motion similar to that previously granted in favor of Okland 
Construction. Martin Stern therefore supports and joins in the 
arguments of Okland Construction to the effect that Little 
America7 s claims for contractual indemnification, express or 
implied and/or equitable indemnification are barred by the 
statute of repose at 78-12-25.5. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute of repose for architects and builders at 78-12-
25. 5 is not unconstitutional under an open courts analysis, an 
equal protection analysis or a due process analysis. Plaintiff 
is not denied a remedy because he can still sue the owner and/or 
materialmen who are not subject to the statute of repose. The 
statute of repose serves legitimate state objectives and social 
policy as declared by the Legislature of the State of Utah. The 
statute of repose is reasonably related to those legitimate 
social policy objectives, and does not unduly or irrationally 
16 
discriminate in favor of architects and builders. 
Plaintiff's appeal must be denied as respects the tolling 
provisions of U. C. A. 78-12-35 for the reason that the same, as 
applied to Martin Stern, are an unconstitutional burden upon 
interstate commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution of the United States under recent and controlling 
authority announced by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The appeals of plaintiff and co-defendant Little America 
Corporation should be denied and the orders of the trial court 
affirmed. *l 
DATED this J ^ l ^ day of April, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
$ ^ ^ X Jefftybyf L. Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Respondent Martin 
Stern, Jr. AIA Architect & 
Associates, Inc. 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
JAMES SANCHEZ, 
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vs 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
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corporation, MARTIN STERN, JR. 
AND AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES, 
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POOLS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation and 
JOHN DOES I THROUGH in, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER OF 
MARTIN STERN, JR., AIA, 
ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES 
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C87-268 
Judge David S. Young 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendant Martin Stern, Jr., AIA, Architect <5c Associates, a California 
professional corporation, through its counsel Jeffrey L. Silvestrini of and for Cohne, 
Rappaport 6c Segal responds to the Second Amended Complaint of plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state claims for relief against this defendant upon 
which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against this defendant are barred by virtue of the provisions of 
§78-12-25.5 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, for the reason that more than seven (7) years have 
elapsed after the completion of construction of the swimming pool and sauna and/or 
other improvements to real property which form the basis for plaintiffs claims. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Defendant responds to the specific allegations of plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
1. In response to paragraph 2 of the Second Amended Complaint, this defendant 
asserts that the party which contracted with Little America Corporation and/or Little 
America Refining Company for architectural services in connection with the 
construction of the Little America Hotel is Martin Stern, Jr., AIA, Architect <3c 
Associates, a California professional corporation, and not Martin Stern,, Jr. & Associates, 
a California partnership. Martin Stern, Jr., AIA, Architect <5c Associates, a corporation, 
admits this court's jurisdiction over it in connection with tfie Little America Hotel 
pursuant to 78-27-24 et seq., U.C.A., 1953. This defendant denies that it is regularly 
engaged in the business of designing pools and saunas as part of its architectural design 
service as further alleged in paragraph 2. 
2. This defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 
46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 53 (second paragraph numbered 53), 55, 56, 57 and 58. 
3. In response to the allegations of paragraphs 24, 27, 32, 36, 40, 43, 48, 52, 54, 
59, 63, 66, 71, 75, 78, 83, 87, 90, 95, 99 and 102, this defendant reincorporates by 
reference its response to the paragraphs referenced therein. 
4. This defendant lacks information to form an opinion as to all remaining 
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint and therefore denies the same in their 
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entirety. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against this defendant are barred under the doctrine of 
comparative negligence as the negligence of plaintiff equalled or exceeded that of 
defendants and this defendant in particular. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages and to the extent he has not done so, 
this defendant is entitled to a defense or offset against plaintiffs claims herein. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Given the length of time that has elapsed since the improvements which are the 
subject of this action were designed and constructed, plaintiffs claims hereunder are 
barred under the doctrine of laches. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against this defendant are barred by virtue of plaintiffs 
assumption of the risk related to his conduct and plaintiffs claims are therefore barred 
under the Utah comparative negligence statute. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
The instant project, insofar as the pool and sauna were concerned, was a design-
build project implemented by a party or parties other than this defendant, subject only to 
the general scheme for floor plan and layout and other similar criteria provided by this 
defendant. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs damages were caused or contributed to by persons, conditions or acts 
outside of the control of this defendant. 
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TENTH DEFENSE 
Any of plaintiffs claims of breach of any express or implied warranty are barred 
by virtue of the provisions of §§70A-2-316, 70A-2-317, 70A-2-607 and 70A-2-725, 
U.C.A., 1953. / 
DATED this / J day of April, 1988. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Martin Stern, Jr., AIA 
Architect & Associates and 
Martin Stern, Jr. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the iS-^-flay of April, 1988 to the following: 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J, DeBry & Associates 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Paul M. Belnap 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys for Little America Hotel, Inc. and Little America Refining 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Donald J. Purser, Esq. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
